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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KIRT OVERSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY and 
GUARA:-JTY COMPAHY aka 
USF&G, an insurance company, 
~efendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 15470 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by plaintiff 
insured against defendant insurer to determine the effect of 
coverage provisions of an insurance policy. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury, The Honorable J. Harlan Burns 
presiding. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the court, 
upon a motion for dismissal by the defendant, dismissed the 
plaintiff's action with prejudice. From the dismissal order, the 
plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the dismissal order 
and remand to the District Court for a trial on the merits to 
thP jury. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by plaintiff 
against defendant insurance company. Plaintiff seeks to compel 
defendant insurance company to fulfill its obligation under an 
insurance policy to defend plaintiff in an action brought against 
plaintiff by Stephenson's, Inc., a Utah corporation, and pay a~ 
judgment which may be rendered against the plaintiff therein up 
to the policy limits. 
Stephenson's, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Stephenson's) 
is an implement dealer in Holden, Utah. Stephenson's entered into 
a contract with Triple "C" Farms to construct two quonset type 
metal buildings. Stephenson's was to furnish both the materials 
and the labor for the project. Upon completion, the metal struc· 
tures were to be used by Triple "C" Farms as potato storage 
facilities. Pursuant to its contract with Triple "C" Farms, 
Stephenson's hired Kirt Overson as the subcontractor to do the 
actual erecting and insulating of the metal structures. 
Stephenson's furnished the prefabricated metal (Trial Court Trans· 
cript, p. 12) and Overson put it together at the job site. 
(Trial Court Transcript, p. 13). 
Other subcontractors were also hired--some by Stephenson's 
and some apparently by Triple "C" Farms. One subcontractor did 
the excavation work; another formed and poured the cement footings: 
d d another subcontractor did the interior carpentry work; another 1 
the electrical wiring; and a different one did the ventilation 
system. (Trial Court Transcript, pp. 13-15). 
-2-
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The construction process was supervised at each stage 
~ Stephenson's and Triple "C" Farms. (Trial Court Transcript, 
PP· 24-26, 54-55). After the buildings had been erected and 
insulated, Stephenson's directed Overson to enlarge the size of 
the ventilation louvers in the ends of the buildings. (Trial 
court Transcript, pp. 24-25). While two of Overson's employees 
were cutting off the head of a bolt with an acetylene torch so 
they could enlarge the air vent, the insulation suddenly ignited. 
The fire spread rapidly, completely destroying the building 
within minutes. 
Stephenson's filed a suit against Overson to recover for 
damages sustained by reason of the fire. Overson tendered the 
defense to his insurer, the United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company. The insurer refused to defend, claiming an exclusion 
in the policy precluded Overson's coverage. The policy provisions 
in question read as follows: 
This insurance does not apply: 
(a) To liability assumed by the insured 
under any contract or agreement except 
an incidental contract; but this ex-
clusion does not apply to a warranty 
of fitness or quality of the named 
insured's products or a warranty that 
work performed by or on behalf of the 
named insured will be done in a work-
manlike manner; 
* * * 
(k) to property damage to 
* * * 
(3) property in the care, custody, or 
control of the insured or as to 
which the insured is for any pur-
pose exercising physical control. 
* * * 
-3-
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(o) to property damage to work performed 
by or on behalf of the named insured 
arising out of the work or any por-
tion thereof, or out of materials, 
parts or equipment furnished in 
connection therewith; 
The refusal by USF&G, the defendant insurance company, to 
defend plaintiff in the suit filed by Stephenson's spawned this 
present action. Plaintiff is seeking a declaration of defendant': 
duty to defend and to pay any judgment up to the policy limits 
which may be rendered. 
party 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A JUDGMENT 
FOR DEFENDANT, THEREBY DEPRIVING PLAINTIFF 
OF HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL, SINCE FACTS 
AND ISSUES UPON WHICH REASONABLE MINDS 
COULD DIFFER WERE RAISED AND REMAIN UN-
RESOLVED. 
Rule 50 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a I 
to move for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence , 
I 
proffered by his opponent. It was under this rule that the mtiMI 
I 
was made in the trial court. 
The motion for a directed verdict should be granted only 
cautiously, since it deprives the party of a determination of the 
facts by a jury. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
Civil, §2524, and cases cited therein. Ci ting from the Wright & I 
Miller treatise: 
In determining whether the evidence is 
sufficient, the court is not free to weigh 
the evidence or to pass upon the credibility 
of witnesses or to substitute its judgment 
of the facts for that of the jury. Instead 
it must view the evidence most favorable to 
the party against whom the motion is made 
-4-
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and give that party the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences from the evidence. 
(See cases cited therein.) 
Perhaps the most concise statement of the test was stated 
by the Second Circuit in Sirnblest v. Maynard, C.A.2d, 1970, 427 
f.2d 1,4: 
Simply stated, it is whether the evidence 
is such that, without weighing the credi-
bility of the witnesses or otherwise 
considering the weight of the evidence, 
there can be but one conclusion as to 
the verdict that reasonable men could have 
reached. 
Utah follows the formulation for the test for a directed 
verdict that has developed in the federal courts, since Utah's 
Rule 50(a) is identical to the Federal Rule 50(a). In the case 
of Boskovich v. Utah Construction Company, 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 
885 (1953), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a case on appeal 
following a directed verdict for the defendant. The question was 
whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the 
defendant. The court said: 
... In deciding a motion for a directed 
verdict, the court must consider the 
evidence in the light most favorable to 
the party against whom the motion is 
directed and must resolve every contro-
verted fact in his favor. /Cites./ 
The inquiry, then, must be directed toward 
whether reasonable minds could disagree 
in the case on the evidence presented so 
as to provide a question for the jury. 
Also see Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P.2d 491 (1952). 
Remembering that all the evidence must be viewed most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, the ques-
tion comes down to the reasonable man test--whether the minds of 
-5-
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reasonable men could differ. The appellant maintains that 
reasonable men could differ on the particulars of this case as 
presented at trial because (A) the contract provisions ar 
e ambig~ 1 
and (B) several fact issues were raised needing jury determinatio: 
A. THE INSURANCE POLICY PROVISIONS RELIED UPON 
BY THE DEFENDANT ARE AMBIGUOUS AND THEREBY 
REQUIRE JURY INTERPRETATION. 
The phrases of the insurance policy upon which the de~~ 
dant insurance company rely are not clear. They are ambiguous. 
The ~hrase "care, custody or control" is not defined anywhere~ 
the policy. Rather, it is boiler-plate language found in almost 
all industrial liability insurance policies. These words, part 
of the form contract written exclusively by the insurance company, 
are purposefully kept general in nature in an attempt to exclude 
coverage in a myriad of situations. Numerous cases dealing with 
I 
identical or similar "care, custody or control" clauses have been 
held to be ambiguous. Arrigo' s Fleet Service, Inc. v. Aetna Life 
& Casualty Company, 54 Mich. App. 482, 221 N. W. 2d 206 (1974); 
Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin v. 
Puyear Wood Products Company, 247 Ark. 673, 447 S.W.2d 139 (19691 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Haas, 422 S.W.2d 316 (Mo. 1%!]· 
Fall's Sheet Metal Work v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty C~ 
17 Ohio App.2d 209, 245 N.E.2d 733 (1969). 
Clause (o) of the insurance policy, cited supra, is equali: 
general and devoid of specific meaning. Several courts have held 
that the phrase is ambiguous. The Arizona Supreme Court, in 
Federal Insurance Company v. P. A. T. Homes, Inc., 113 Ariz. 1361 
-6-
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547 P.2d 1050 (1976), held that an insurance policy containing 
language identical to that in clause (a) and clause (o), cited 
supra, was ambiguous when compared to each other. The Arizona 
court said: 
The policy must be read as a whole in order 
to give reasonable and harmonious meaning 
and effect to all of its provisions. 
Reading the clauses together, the court pointed out that 
more than one construction of the provisions was possible. It went 
on to hold the clauses to be ambiguous and construed them nost strongly 
against the insurer and in favor of the insured. 
A Louisiana court, in Hendricks Electrical Company, Inc. v. 
Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, La. App., 1974, 297 So.2d 470, con-
strued a general liability insurance clause identical to clause (o) 
as excluding only the damage to the property actually being worked 
on by the contractor (an electrical switch). It did not exclude 
coverage for the entire building which was damaged by a fire caused 
by the negligence of the contractor in working on the switch. See 
also Roland Construction Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 
72 Wash.2d 682, 434 P.2d 725 (1967). 
Admittedly, some courts have found the language of clause (k) 
and clause (o), cited supra, to be clear and unambiguous. However, 
the logic of Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance Company of 
Wisconsin v. Puyear Wood Products Company, Supra, appears irrebuttable: 
The very fact that courts of similar 
jurisdictions have arrived at different 
construction as to the meaning of the 
words under discussion, and even in some 
instances have gone so far as to take 
-7-
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almost opposite views, is certainly some 
indication that the terms in the context 
used are ambiguous. 
See also Federal Insurance Company v P A T Homes I 
_ _ · . . . . , nc., ~ 
at 1052. 
Ambiguity in an insurance contract results in strict con-
struction against the insurer. This rule of strict construction 
is no different when the "care, custody and control" or clause~ 
exclusions are involved. Federal Insurance Com an v. P. A. T, i:i 
Inc., Supra; United State Fire Insurance Company v. Schnabel, so; 
P.2d 847 (Alas. 1972); Boswell v. Travelers Indemnity Companz, 
38 N.J.Super. 599, 120 A.2d 250 (1956); Innis v. McDonald, 77 Ohi: 
L.Abs. 417, 150 N.E.2d 441 (1956). 
Ambiguity in a written insurance contract also creates an 
interpretive question within the exclusive purview of the jury. 
75 Am. Jur.2d, Trials, §411, states the rule in these words: 
While it is true as a general rule that the 
construction of written contracts belongs 
to the court and not the jury, there are 
nevertheless cases in which the ambiguous 
nature of the words used or an obscure 
reference to unexplained circumstances 
requires that the interpretation of the 
language be left to the consideration of 
the jury for the purpose of carrying into 
effect the real intention of the parties. 
It is for the jury to determine what is 
the agreement of the parties, where there 
is uncertainty in a written contract because 
of ambiguity or incompleteness or technical 
words or terms of art. 
Certainly in this case there is uncertainty in the writW 
b f mb · · t · Therefore, i.· t i.· s proper that th! contract ecause o a i.gui ies. 
jury decide what the contract was to mean in light of the particu· 
lar circumstances of the case. 
-8-
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B. THE QUESTION OF FACT AS TO WHO HAD CARE 
CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF THE BUILDING PREMISES 
WAS RAISED BY THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE, AND, 
THEREFORE, THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE. 
Overson was hired by Stephenson's to essentially be the 
erection and installation subcontractor. (Trial Court Transcript, 
pp. 12, 13). Other parties were hired, either by Stephenson's or 
Triple "C" Farms, to carry out the other necessary functions in 
construction. (Trial Court Transcript, pp. 13-15, 23). Stephenson's 
oversaw the entire project, apparently serving as the general con-
tractor. (Trial Court Transcript, pp. 25,26). Stephenson, Stephenson's 
employees, and all the various subcontractors were on and off the 
job site from the beginning of construction until the day of the 
fire. (Trial Court Transcript, pp. 38-40). Also, other interested 
parties outside the general and subcontractors, were at the job site 
on a regular basis. (Trial Court Transcript, p. 40). 
It is apparent that the job site was not the exclusive 
domain of Overson and his employees. Rather, a number of different 
parties had unrestricted access to the building site during the 
entire construction period. Triple "C" Farms was the record land 
owner of the job site. Certainly they had possessory "custody and 
control". Stephenson's, apparently acting as the general contractor 
of the project, had the physical "custody and control" of the job 
site. Each subcontractor as he came on to the job site had the 
same "custody and control" as Overson. 
In light of all the various parties participating, which 
one or ones had the "care, custody or control" spoken of in the 
-9-
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insurance policy provisions? If more than one party had "care, 
custody or control", does it negate any "care, custody or contra; 
that Overson might have had? The insurance policy provisions re), 
upon by the insurance company leave these questions and many othe· 
I 
unanswered. Therefore, a factual question for the jury in light 
of the particular facts of this case, exists as to whether Overso•. 
had the requisite "care, custody or control" to trigger the clair;: 
policy exclusions. This issue was clearly raised by the exarninat:: 
and cross-examination of plaintiff's witnesses in the trial court. 
It is the province of the jury to r:take factual deterrnina· ! 
tions. The trial court erred in denying the plaintiff his ri~tt 
have the jury make the determinations of the facts in this case. 
That a fact issue for the jury existed was demonstrated bi 
the trial judge himself. Two motions for summary judgments by the 1 
defendant before trial were denied. (Trial Record, pp. 60,95), 
The reason that the court ruled against summary judgment was that 
an issue of fact was presented which required jury resolution. 
It seems a paradox that after two summary judgment denials, the 
trial judge would take the case away from the jury and preclude 
their determination of the issues. 
That factual issues for the jury are present in this case 
can be illustrated by two cases that are factually indistinguishab!: 
from this one. First, General Mutual Insurance Company v. WrilJ.1:!1 
7 Misc.2d 331, 161 N.Y.Supp.2d 974 (1957), involved a contractor 
that had erected a metal framed school building. During a 
violent storm the frame was blown over, causing extensive 
-10-
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damage to the steel and masonry piers which supported it. General 
Mutual, which had insured the contractor from liability, denied 
coverage on the basis of a policy clause excluding coverage for 
damage to property in the "care, custody or control" of the 
insured. Ruling that the insurance company's position was without 
merit, the court stated: 
This /plaintiff's/ argument is specious. 
It assumes that In order to work on some-
thing, you must have custody of it. This 
is certainly not true of a large steel 
frame furnished by someone else, and being 
erected on still another party's property. 
The facts of the instant case are almost identical to 
those of Wright. Wright was constructing a steel frame furnished 
by someone else on a third party's land. In our case, Overson was 
erecting a steel building from metal furnished by Stephenson's on 
Triple "C" Farms' land. The question of custody is just the same 
in our case as it was in the Wright case. 
In another case, Anderson v. Brown, 21 Mich.App. 699, 
176 N.W.2d 457 (1970), a house on which a contractor was doing 
carpentry work and which was 75 percent completed, was destroyed 
by fire, allegedly caused by the contractor's negligence in using 
a dangerous heating arrangement. The contractor brought suit 
against his liability insurer for a declaratory judgment regarding 
insurance coverage. The trial court directed a verdict for the 
defendant-insurer, holding that the "care, custody or control" 
exclusion absolved the insurer of liability. On appeal, the trial 
court's decision was reversed and remanded for two reasons. One, 
the appellate court stated that the meaning of the "care, custody 
-11-
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or control" exclusion required a jury interpretation. Two, the 
court held that where evidence established that the house was 
nearing completion and that the owners themselves had subcont 
ract; 
out some of the work, a jury could have reasonably concluded that 
the house was not under the "care, custody or control" of the 
contractor. 
In the instant case, the two quonset huts were also neari:. 
completion, and both the owner, Triple "C" Farms, and Stephenson's 
had independently contracted out some of the work. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in directing a judgment for the 
defendant. A directed verdict is only appropriate when viewing 
the evidence most favorable to the party against whom the motion 
is made and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable infer· 
ences the minds of reasonable men could not differ. In our case 
the minds of reasonable men could differ as to the outcome for 
two reasons. One, the insurance exclusion is ambiguous and subjec: 
to many interpretations; therefore, the responsibility of its 
interpretation falls upon the jury. Two, a factual issue exists 
as to the amount of control Overson exerted over the building, 
since he was but one of the many parties involved in the construct:·! 
process. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court should revers: 
the judgment and remand it for a new trial to the jury on the 
merits. 
-12-
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Respectfully submitted 
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